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Jérôme Dokic & Margherita Arcangeli
In this reply to Anne-Sophie Brüggen‘s comments to our target paper, we focus on
three main issues. First, we explain that although our account of imaginative re-
creation is in many respects metaphysically neutral, it allows for a taxonomy of
imaginings that goes beyond mere phenomenological observations and pre-theor-
etical intuitions. Second, we defend our interpretation of the distinction between
objective and subjective imagination and compare it with Brüggen‘s own sugges-
tions involving the notion of an empty point of view. Third, we insist that the no-
tion of experiential perspective should be construed broadly and include cognitive
or belief-like imagination.
Keywords
Cognitive imagination | Empty point of view | Objective imagination | Phenomeno-
logy | Re-creation | Subjective imagination
We would like to thank Anne-Sophie Brüggen for her very inter-
esting comments on our paper. In what follows, we try to respond
to what we see as the central points raised in her discussion.
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1 On the notion of re-creation
In our target paper, we use a notion of re-creation
in order to set up a sophisticated taxonomy of ex-
periential  imagination.  We also profess  a certain
neutrality with respect to this notion. Anne-Sophie
Brüggen argues that our neutrality is only appar-
ent, and that we in fact oscillate between two sub-
stantial notions of re-creation, which have quite dif-
ferent implications for the ontology of imaginings.
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Our professed neutrality concerns only the
subpersonal  underpinnings  of  imagination.  We
do not want to commit ourselves to the view
that imaginings and their non-imaginative coun-
terparts  share  neural  or  functional  resources.
We do not  explicitly  vindicate  any  neutrality
with respect to the notion of re-creation at the
personal level. However, we intend to be neutral
at that level too, in the following respect. In our
account, the phrase “X re-creates Y” should be
used  synonymously  with  the  phrase  “X is  Y-
like”, to mean that an imagining of type X has
a phenomenal character analogous to the phe-
nomenal character of a non-imaginative state of
type  Y.  For  instance,  visual  imagination  is
visual-like  in  the  sense  that  its  phenomenal
character  is  more similar  to  visual  perception
than, say, auditory perception or belief. In gen-
eral, what matters for our purposes is that there
is  a  systematic  correspondence  between  the
imaginative and the non-imaginative realms; the
metaphysical  nature  of  this  correspondence  is
left open.
Now, Brüggen raises an interesting ques-
tion, namely whether (notwithstanding our in-
tentions)  our  account  shows  an  oscillation
between two different metaphysical conceptions
of  re-creation. On the first (mode-based) con-
ception,  there  are different  imaginative  modes
corresponding to kinds of experience in the non-
imaginative  realm.  On  the  second  (content-
based) conception, which Brüggen attributes to
Mike Martin, all imaginings belong to a single
imaginative mode but represent different kinds
of experience as part of their contents.
Brüggen suggests (following Martin’s 2002
interpretation)  that  Peacocke’s  General  Hypo-
thesis (1985) already carries a commitment to
the content-based conception. We disagree. The
phrase  “imagining  being  in  some  conscious
state” (Peacocke 1985, p. 21) does not obviously
entail that the conscious state is represented in
the content of the imagining. It is compatible
with taking the expression “being in some con-
scious state” to be a modifier of “imagining”,
just  as  the  internal  accusative  “a  song”  is  a
modifier of “singing” in “singing a song”. Per-
haps we are wrong about Peacocke’s intentions,
but we insist that our use of the General Hypo-
thesis  can  be  metaphysically  neutral  in  this
sense.
What about the mode-based conception of
re-creation? We concede that some of our for-
mulations, especially when we introduce the dis-
tinction between objective and subjective ima-
gination, evoke such a conception.  As it  hap-
pens, we have both rejected the content-based
conception in other works (Dokic 2008;  Arcan-
geli 2011a,  2011b).  However,  many aspects  of
our  taxonomy  can  be  re-formulated  in  terms
more amenable to the latter conception. For in-
stance,  the  distinction  between  objective  and
subjective imagination might be construed as a
distinction  between  imaginings  that  represent
external experiences and imaginings that repres-
ent  internal  experiences  as  part  of  their  con-
tents. Whether all aspects of our taxonomy can
be  re-formulated  in  this  way is  indeed  some-
thing that should be explored further.
Brüggen  eventually  recommends  getting
rid of the notion of re-creation, and going for a
purely  phenomenological  taxonomy  based  on
pre-theoretical intuitions. It is worth contrasting
our methodology with hers. In many respects,
our  taxonomy  rests  on  well-identified  phe-
nomenological  types.  For  instance,  all  visual
imaginings  are  clearly  unified  under  a  single
phenomenological type. The latter can then eas-
ily  be  related  to  a  kind of  experience  in  the
non-imaginative  realm,  namely  visual  experi-
ences. In other cases, identifying non-imaginat-
ive  counterparts  is  more  difficult  because  the
relevant imaginings do not form a well-identified
phenomenological type. We agree with Brüggen
that there may not be a phenomenology of ob-
jective (as opposed to subjective) imagination.
Still, there is no need to introduce a metaphys-
ically-loaded  conception  of  re-creation  (either
mode-based  or  content-based)  to  ground  the
distinction  between  objective  and  subjective
imagination. It is enough that phenomenological
contrasts can be drawn between particular cases
of objective imagination and particular cases of
subjective imagination in various domains. This
is  exactly  how  Vendler (1984)  introduces  the
distinction in the domain of imagining actions.
At  this  point,  our  method departs  from phe-
nomenology and becomes abductive and specu-
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lative. In our view, the best explanation of the
relevant phenomenological contrasts is that the
imaginings correspond to different kinds of ex-
perience in the non-imaginative realm, namely
external and internal experiences. We need not
rely  exclusively  on  pre-theoretical  intuitions.
Our taxonomy is indeed grounded in particular
phenomenological  contrasts,  but  it  is  also  in-
formed  by  (controversial)  theoretical  notions,
such as the notion of an external (as opposed to
an internal) experience.
2 On the distinction between objective 
and subjective imagination
Brüggen finds our distinction between objective
and subjective imagination “very helpful” (this
collection, p. 9), but she is worried about the
way  we  flesh  out  the  distinction.  We  have
already answered one of her worries,  which is
that  our  account  of  the  distinction  carries  a
commitment to  the  mode-based  conception  of
re-creation. As we have suggested, our account
is  compatible  with  the  alternative,  content-
based conception. Another worry of Brüggen’s
is that it is unclear how our notions of objective
and  subjective  imagination  differ  from  Vend-
ler’s.  Brüggen grounds  this  worry in  the  fact
that our account leaves room for the claim that
both  objective  and  subjective  imagination  al-
ways involve the self implicitly (this collection,
p. 5).
As  far  as  objective  imagination  is  con-
cerned,  our  examples  certainly  suggest  that
when  one  objectively  (e.g.,  visually)  imagines
oneself in an explicit way (e.g., as a rider or as
showing  a  pinched  face),  one’s  imagining  can
also be implicitly self-involving. This does not
mean that the imaginer’s self is involved twice.
Here the imaginer’s self is involved only in an
explicit way (as we point out all too briefly in
the beginning of section 4.1 of our target paper,
our  definition  of  implicit  self-involvement  ex-
cludes that the same self that is involved both
implicitly and explicitly in a single imagining).
The claim that objective imagination is  always
implicitly  self-involving  does  not  immediately
follow from these examples, but it is admittedly
consistent with our account.
Things are more complicated with respect
to  subjective  imagination.  We argue  that  the
latter can be either implicitly or explicitly self-
involving,  although  we  also  acknowledge  that
the latter is controversial, since it assumes that
we can have an internal experience that expli-
citly  represents  the  self  as  such.  Taking  for
granted that some subjective imaginings can ex-
plicitly involve the self,  it  is hard to see how
they can also be implicitly self-involving. This is
so because of the very nature of the re-created
internal experience. An internal experience can
only  be  about  a  (physical  or  mental)  state
whose bearer is identical with the bearer of the
experience  itself.  It  is  not  possible  to  have  a
proprioceptive experience of another’s body, or
to  introspect  someone  else’s  mental  states.
When a subjective imagining re-creates an in-
ternal experience that explicitly represents the
self (the imaginer’s or someone else’s), the latter
cannot but be the self of the re-created experi-
ence. Thus the imagining is not implicitly self-
involving, according to our definition.
Moreover,  even  granting  Brüggen’s  claim
that  objective  and  subjective  imagination  al-
ways involve the self implicitly, we do not see
how this leads us back to Vendler’s account of
the distinction. For us, the key to the distinc-
tion is not the distinction between explicit and
implicit self-involvement, but rather the distinc-
tion between external and internal experiences.
Indeed, the latter distinction has to do with as-
pects of the self, since we have defined an in-
ternal experience as being normally de se; but,
as we have seen, the de se nature of internal ex-
periences  can  be  explained  independently  of
whether  the  self  is  explicitly  or  implicitly  in-
volved in the relevant imaginings.
Brüggen introduces the notion of an empty
point of view as an additional tool for the theory
of imagination. For instance, when a subject visu-
ally  imagines  the  Panthéon,  her  imagining  in-
volves a perspective that is not occupied by her-
self or anyone else. In other words, it is not re-
quired that there be an observer in the imaginary
world (the  subject  can  visualize  an  unseen
Panthéon). If  this is the right interpretation of
Brüggen’s notion of an empty point of view, we
already have it in our toolbox. For we claim that
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the first-person perspective from which the sub-
ject is imagining the Panthéon can remain virtual
or counterfactual, in the sense that she is imagin-
ing a situation from a spatial perspective that a
normally-sighted subject  would have if she were
suitably oriented in the imaginary world.
Brüggen suggests  that  we  could  use  the
notion of  an empty point of  view to “further
sharpen” the distinction between objective and
subjective  imagination  (this collection,  p.  6).
The idea seems to be that objective imagination
always involves an empty point of view, while
subjective imagination never does. Let us grant
that this idea is broadly correct. We still think
that  our  account  of  objective  and  subjective
imagination as re-creating external and internal
experiences can provide a more fundamental ex-
planation. One might claim that subjective ima-
gination creates more ontological constraints on
the imaginary world than objective imagination.
A subjective imagining represents a state whose
bearer  can only  be  that  of  the  re-created  in-
ternal experience itself. If such a state is ontolo-
gically dependent on a bearer, one cannot ima-
gine the former in a world in which the latter
does not exist. Thus, subjective imagination im-
poses the existence of a self  in the imaginary
world, whether or not the self in question is ex-
plicitly represented. In contrast, since objective
imagination  re-creates  an  external  experience,
one might argue that it is free from the specific
constraints of subjective imagination, and need
not impose the existence of any self in the ima-
ginary world. 
Toward the end of her commentary, Brüg-
gen also suggests that the notion of an empty
point of view can help us to distinguish between
imaginings and non-imaginative experiences. If
we understand her correctly,  her suggestion is
that in contrast to imaginings, non-imaginative
experiences  must involve an occupied point of
view. This is an interesting suggestion, and we
do not  see  why we cannot  take  it  on  board.
Brüggen thinks  otherwise  and  writes:  “Dokic
and  Arcangeli  seem to  think  that  imaginings
mirror non-imaginative sates with respect to the
nature  of  the  point  of  view  involved  (again
probably  partly  due  to  the  notion  of  re-cre-
ation)” (this collection, p. 9). However, as de-
tailed above, our account is more neutral and
does not carry such a commitment. We do not
posit a specific relationship between imaginings
and non-imaginative states, but for the sake of
argument let us put in a good word for a less
neutral view. Even if one claims that imaginings
mirror  (or  simulate) non-imaginative states  in
the sense that they are dependent on the latter,
thus  holding  an  asymmetrical  relationship
between those kinds of mental states, one is not
committed  to  the  conclusion  that  imaginings
mirror  every  aspect  of  non-imaginative  sates
(e.g., the nature of the point of view). Further
specifications are needed about what precisely is
preserved  and  according  to  which  mapping
function (Arcangeli 2011b).
3 On cognitive imagination
Brüggen is hesitant about our classification of
cognitive imaginings as experiential imaginings.
Her main reason for being hesitant is not that
the  notion  of  cognitive  phenomenology  is  ill-
conceived. On the contrary, she is attracted by
the view that beliefs have a special phenomenal
character. She thinks that cognitive imaginings
do not involve an experiential  perspective be-
cause she  construes  the notion of  experiential
perspective  quite  narrowly,  as  a  spatial  ego-
centric perspective. In our view, Brüggen’s con-
strual of the notion of experiential perspective
is too narrow. On this construal, many non-cog-
nitive imaginings turn out to be non-experien-
tial as well. Some cases of sensory imaginings,
involving auditory, olfactory, or gustatory ima-
gination, do not always clearly involve a spatial
egocentric  perspective.  Many  imaginings  that
re-create  internal  experiences  (excluding  per-
haps proprioception) do not involve such a per-
spective either. For our part, we do not see why
the notion of experiential perspective should be
restricted to the spatial egocentric case.
4 Conclusion
We have not tried to be exhaustive and answer
every point raised in Brüggen’s rich comment-
ary here. But we still hope that we have dealt
with her main concerns. Despite the fact that
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our minimal notion of re-creation does not in-
troduce  a  substantial  metaphysical  relation
between the imaginative and the non-imaginat-
ive realms, it should be conceived as a place-
holder for such a relation. Our taxonomy can
then be taken as a starting-point for, and per-
haps a constraint on, a full-blooded theory of
the ontology of imagination.
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